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Chapter 15
Risk Management and Pension Plan Choice
in Japan
Masaharu Usuki
Pension plan sponsors and managers of defined benefit (DB) plans in
Japan faced many hardships over the last fourteen years. Above all, the
depressed stock market and declining interest rates have contributed to the
rapid spread of DB plan underfunding. In addition, new accounting stand-
ards introduced in fiscal 2000 made unfunded pension liabilities a greater
concern for plan sponsors. Further, plan sponsors have been disappointed
with the ineffectiveness of measures taken in the field of asset manage-
ment, because of the narrowing risk premium in capital markets since
2000. Increasingly they are turning their eyes to the field of liability man-
agement and benefit design, seeking to control the financial risks of the
pension plans offered. Measures taken include plan termination, benefit
reduction, put-back of the contracted-out portion, and adoption of cash
balance or defined contribution (DC) plans.
In this chapter, we evaluate whether and to what extent these changes in
benefit design were influenced by sponsors’ desire to control financial risk.
We select several plan financial characteristics that affect risk tolerance and
asset allocation decisions, such as the funding ratio, and examine whether
these variables influence decisions regarding plan termination and put-
back of the contracted-out portion of Employee Pension Funds (EPFs). In
particular, we examine the hypothesis that plan sponsors have altered the
plan type they offer, as a way to control risks in pension management. We
find that the pension plan’s funding ratio, volatility of the plan sponsor’s
return on equity, and the size of the pension plan relative to the plan
sponsor’s total assets do exert an influence on decisions to change pension
plan types.
This research is of general interest for at least two reasons. First, pension
plans in other countries today face similar challenges that their Japanese
counterparts have experienced in the last decade. These challenges consist
of a depressed stock market, declining interest rates, increasing longevity
risk, and unfavorable regulatory changes (especially in the accounting
arena). Japanese plan sponsor reactions, in terms of changing their benefit
design, may offer valuable insights for others in similar circumstances.
Second, how financial risk influences pension plan offerings is an import-
ant area of pension research that has yet to be thoroughly explored. We
seek to shed light on these issues by analyzing what drives pension plan
design in Japan.
Defined Benefit Plan Sponsor Risk Sensitivity
The Tokyo stock market began to plummet in 1990, and since then,
Japanese investors have grown increasingly concerned about financial
risks. DB pension plan sponsors were no exception. A key problem was
that it became difficult for pension funds to earn higher returns by taking
investment risks. The Nikkei stock average fell 80 percent, from the 1989
year-end peak of 38,916 yen the April 2003 level of 7,831 yen. Assuming the
average stock market risk premium of 5.44 percent from 1953 to 2002 is
maintained, and adding this to the nominal risk free rate of 1.95 percent
(from 1990 to 2002), the ex ante probability of the historical rate of return
on the Tokyo Stock Exchange Index (TOPIX) is below one percent (Usuki
2003).1 Such disappointing rates of return on pension fund investments
were naturally of grave concern, since domestic stocks constitute 30 per-
cent of DB plan assets in Japan.
Over the last forty years, Japanese DB plans have been of two main types,
namely the EPFs and the Tax Qualified Pension Plans (TQPPs; see Clark
and Mitchell 2002). The EPFs have a contracted-out portion that is
managed by the plan sponsor as a partial substitute for a component of
the public retirement benefit. As a consequence, the EPFs have some
quasi-public characteristics not found in TQPPs, and accordingly, data on
EPFs are more easily obtained than for TQPPs. Published data indicate that
the average return on assets managed by EPFs was two percent in nominal
terms and 0.4 percent in real terms in the 1989–2003 period (Pension
Fund Association 2003).
Especially from 2000, the premium per unit of risk or volatility declined,
as compared to the preceding period. Yen-based premiums over the risk-
free rate fell in asset classes such as domestic and foreign stocks, and also in
domestic bonds although to a lesser degree. At the same time, volatility, as
gauged by the standard deviation of return, increased notably in foreign
bonds and stocks. As a result, the 60-month Sharpe Ratio decreased uni-
formly for all asset classes. This clearly hurt DB plans, since in addition to
holding domestic as well as foreign bonds and stocks, DB plans also tend to
invest around fifteen of total assets in fixed-yield contracts sold by life
insurers. But the guaranteed yield of these contracts was lowered from
2.5 percent to 1.5 percent in 1999.
A typical Japanese DB plan allocates, respectively, 25, 30, 10, 15, 15, and 5
percent of assets to yen-bonds, yen-stocks, foreign bonds, foreign
stocks, insurance contracts and money market products, the Sharpe Ratio
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declined drastically after 2000 (see Figure 15-1). In other words, while
investment risks increased, investment returns were associated with a de-
clining risk premium.
Pension plan sponsors also had to take into account the impact of
interest rate changes on the liability side of the DB balance sheet. The
twenty-year Japanese government bond yield which stood at 5.7 percent at
the end of 1989, then fell to 2.2 percent in 1999, and 1.3 percent in 2002.
These government bond rates are used to discount DB pension liabilities,
so this decline augmented the economic value of pension liabilities and
increased plan sponsor burdens.
The stagnant rate of return on assets, combined with growing liabilities
caused by the lower discount rate, have contributed to the increasing
pension funding shortfall or decreasing surplus, which is a major down-
side risk for Japanese pension plan sponsors. Figure 15-2 shows that the
share of underfunded EPF plans has continued to rise over time, and it has
exceeded 90 percent in 2001. Plan sponsors have voiced the concern that
these funding shortages will worsen corporative financial ratios under the
Note: Asset allocation in model portfolio and return indexes of each asset class are as follows: 
Asset class Allocation (%)
Yen bonds 25
Yen stocks 30
Foreign bonds 10
Foreign stocks 15
Insurance contracts 15
Cash (Risk-free asset) 5
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Figure 15-1. Monthly Sharpe Ratio of model portfolio returns.
Source : Author’s calculations using data provided by Ibbotson Associates Japan,
except for insurance contracts.
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new accounting standard explained below, and that they could damage
firm market valuation.
Impact of New Accounting Standards. Another factor causing Japanese
pension plan sponsors to become more vividly aware of DB plan financial
risks was the new accounting standard adopted in 2000. Before that, DB
plans recorded only what was contributed to a plan as an expense on the
income statement, without recognizing any liabilities on the balance sheet.
As a consequence, it was unusual for top executives to devote any attention
to DB fund management, unless a large increase in the contribution was
requested.
In 2001, however, an accounting standard became effective, similar to
Financial Accounting Standard 87 in the USA and International Account-
ing Standard 19 (see Chapter 10). This new standard stipulated that the
difference between the market-based value of pension assets and liabilities
(the Projected Benefit Obligation (PBO)) had to be recognized and dis-
closed as an item called ‘accrued pension benefits’ on the liability side of
the plan sponsor’s balance sheet.
When thenew accounting standardwas first applied, the average reported
ratio of DB plan assets to liabilities was 54 percent for companies listed on
the First Section of the Tokyo Stock Exchange (year-end fiscal 2000).2
However, this ratio fell to 46 percent at year-end fiscal 2001 and 42 percent
at 2002, because of the above-mentioned poor return and ballooning value
of liabilities. Plan sponsors were then forced to recognize these deteriorat-
ing funding conditions every six months when financial statements were
published. According to Benartzi and Thaler (1995), themore often people
watch the result of their financial activities, the more risk-averse they be-
come. If this hypothesis holds true for plan sponsors, disclosure of bad
1,800
1,400
1,000
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1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
End of FY
Note: Bar chart shows number of underfunded EPFs, and line chart shows the percentage
to total number of EPFs.
Figure 15-2. Number of underfunded EPFs.
Source : Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare (2003).
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results under the new accounting standard would be predicted to make
them more sensitive to risks in pension fund management and think about
adopting measures to control risks in pension finance.
Shift of Focus from Assets to Liabilities. From the plan sponsor viewpoint,
DB plan management is similar to that of other financial institutions (Davis
1995; Peskin 1997). That is, plan sponsors owe a long-term debt to
employees (the promised pension) which is backed by invested funds. In
these circumstances, changes in investment strategy and benefit design can
both be effective in financial risk management. As a primary measure to
control risk, however, the traditional and universal response in developed
countries has been for DB plan sponsors to change investment strategies
and tactics, especially their asset allocation policies.
As a result, many pension plans in Japan have reduced their allocation to
riskier asset classes since 2000, especially with regard to domestic and
foreign stocks. Some have boosted the share of fixed-yield insurance prod-
ucts, while others moved to long-term domestic and foreign bonds seeking
to bring the duration of assets closer to that of liabilities. Yet such measures
on the asset management side have not served as a panacea. That is, even if
a DB plan successfully engaged in duration-matching or immunization by
investing in fixed income products such as bonds and insurance products,
this would mean that the plan would forego the potential for higher
returns. In the Japanese case, expected rates of return would fall far
below the discount rate used in actuarial calculations. Consequently, no
matter how hard pension funds have tried to reduce risks on the asset side,
they have not succeeded in keeping unfunded liabilities from growing.3
Changes in Pension Plan Types and Benefit Design
Finding it difficult to contain DB plan risk using asset management meas-
ures, Japanese plan sponsors have begun to alter the way they design the
pension plan itself. If we consider benefit obligations to be akin to financial
institution debt, there are two ways to control risks on the corporation’s
balance sheet. One is to eliminate or reduce the debt (or at least stop its
growth), and the other is to reduce the interest rate risk due on debt by
shortening the debt duration. Next we identify five tools that can serve that
the purpose. The first, introducing a cash-balance plan, has the effect of
shortening duration, while the other four (plan termination, benefit re-
duction, put-back of contracted-out portion, and introducing a DC plan)
help reduce, contain, or eliminate pension liabilities and the shortfall of
assets relative to liabilities.
Plan Termination. The two major types of DB plans, EPFs and TQPPs,
declined in number by 12 percent and 28 percent respectively from their
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peaks (see Table 15-1). Termination eliminates the risk of growth in
pension liabilities due to falling discount rates. As a rule, when a
Japanese pension plan is terminated, accumulated assets must be
distributed first to beneficiaries in the form of annuities, and then to
active members either in the form of on-the-spot lump-sum payments or
annuities after retirement. Also employers can establish DC plans and use
the accumulated assets that otherwise would be distributed in cash to
contribute to employees’ accounts in DC plans.
Benefit Reduction. Another way to manage pension risk is to reduce DB
plan benefits. The reduction of benefits accrued from past service was
legalized in 1997, provided that certain conditions are met, including
agreement between labor and management, and the existence of
business difficulties. From fiscal 1997 through 2001, the number of EPFs
whose benefits have been reduced each year was 7, 16, 52, 177, and 114
respectively. The most common pattern has been where pension plans
reduced the annuity amount, by lowering the assumed rate of interest for
the conversion of original lump-sum value into annuities.4 Of late, this
reduction has not been limited to monthly annuity amounts, but rather it
has also affected the value of the lump-sum amount. Another notable
development has occurred in a few cases where pensioners’ benefits have
been pared down.5
Table 15-1 Number of EPFs and TQPPs
Fiscal
year
EPFs
Termination
(dissolution)
EPFs
Put-back of
contracted-out
portion
EPFs
Existing fiscal
year end
TQPPs
Existing fiscal
year end
1991 0 N.A. 1,593 90,434
1992 0 N.A. 1,735 92,082
1993 0 N.A. 1,804 92,467
1994 1 N.A. 1,842 92,355
1995 1 N.A. 1,878 91,465
1996 7 N.A. 1,883 90,239
1997 14 N.A. 1,874 88,312
1998 18 N.A. 1,858 85,047
1999 16 N.A. 1,835 81,605
2000 29 N.A. 1,814 77,555
2001 59 N.A. 1,737 73,582
2002 73 481 1,656 66,741
Source : Pension Fund Association (2003).
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Put-back of Contracted-out Portion. Another way to adjust DB pension
risks applies only to EPFs. This involves the put-back or return of the
assets and liabilities of the contracted-out portion to the public
retirement system. This has become attractive because the decline in
interest rates and increase in longevity have boosted the liability due to
the contracted-out portion. Until recently, however, the rebate rate offered
by the government was too low to compensate for that increase. As a result,
plan sponsors faced the risk of a growing funding shortage in the
contracted-out portion of the benefit.
Very recently, in 2002, the new Defined Benefit Corporate Pension Plan
Law has permitted the return of the contracted-out portion by EPFs on
more attractive terms. This put-back not only relieves DB plan sponsors of
the risks associated with a potential increase in benefit obligations and
shortfalls, but it also enables a plan sponsor to record one-time profits on
its income statement. This is because the value of obligations recognized
on the balance sheet is larger than the value of assets the sponsor must pay
back to the government.6 Plan sponsors have devoted much attention to
this new rule, and by year-end 2003, the government had approved put-
backs by 702 EPFs out of a total of 1,700 plans, including those of blue chip
firms such as Toyota, Hitachi, and NEC.
Cash Balance Plans. Another approach to pension risk management
involves the introduction of cash balance plans. In this new format, each
participant’s account balance increases periodically by the sum of service
credits and interest credits, the latter of which equals the account balance
at the end of the previous year multiplied by the base interest rate. Plan
participants receive the balance of that cash value at the time of job
termination or as an annuity at retirement.
An appeal of this scheme is that falling interest rates boost benefit
liabilities via a declining discount rate, but this increase is offset by smaller
interest rate credits. A lower interest rate, therefore, increases liabilities in a
cash balance plan by much less than in a traditional DB plan. For this
reason, benefit obligations in cash balance plans have a much shorter
duration and their sensitivity to interest rate movements is smaller, than
in traditional DB plans. Hence cash balance plans help plan sponsors to
shift a portion of interest rate risks to plan participants.
This adjustment mechanism can be applied even to the post-retirement
period when annuities are paid. Pension plans can adjust the interest rate
by which the value of the lump-sum payment is converted into annuities, in
synchrony with changes in market interest rates. This adjustment mechan-
ism applied to annuitants is similar to the one for variable annuity products
of life insurance companies.
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Defined Contribution Plans. A final way to adapt benefit design for
risk management purposes is to introduce a DC plan. In 2001, the law
permitted a modest level of employer contributions to this type of pension
under tax-exempt status, and by September 2003, some 538 employers with
529,000 employees had adopted this plan type.7 Some firms established
their new plans from scratch, while others did so as a complete or partial
substitute for existing DB pensions or book-reserve severance-pay schemes.
Plans established as a full or partial replacement for DB plans have the
effect of shifting investment risks from employers to employees.
Managing Pension Portfolios of Liabilities. While the portfolio risk
management process of financial institutions always integrates assets and
liabilities, DB pension management has traditionally focused only on the
asset side. One reason may be that pension benefits have typically been
construed as an exogenous factor to fund managers. Yet the reality now is
that pension plan liabilities have become a more or less controllable
variable in Japan. Pension plan sponsors are seeking ways to control risks
by redesigning benefits, selecting appropriate plan types, reducing the
amount of pension liabilities, and adjusting their duration.
As the concept of ‘portfolio’ management extends beyond investment
vehicles, plan sponsors are beginning to realize that they must also manage
their plan’s liability portfolio. They then begin to question what the trade-
off might be for lower risk in liabilities: that is, should they accept a lower
expected return in exchange for lowering risk, as in the case of an invest-
ment portfolio? To answer this question, we use the analogy of financial
institutions trying to change the composition of liabilities where the com-
position of assets is constant. Here the DB plan may be conceptualized as a
financial operation which borrows money from plan participants and in-
vests the funds thus gained. Plan termination or put-back of the contracted-
out portion has the effect of suspending this operation completely or
partially. The cost of this suspension is the lost opportunity of earning a
higher rate of return than the interest rate on borrowed money and
enjoying resulting profits. Changing a DB into a DC plan has the same
effect. Adopting a cash-balance plan has the effect of converting long-term
fixed interest rate liabilities into floating rate notes. The opportunity costs
are profits potentially achieved by the rise in discount rate when the
duration of liabilities is longer than that of assets.
Whether this perspective is generally applicable in the Japanese context
can be evaluated by examining whether plan sponsors’ financial character-
istics are related in sensible ways to the pension plans they offer. In the next
section, we therefore examine what factors actually affected plan sponsor
decisions regarding the termination of DB plans and the put-back of the
contracted-out portion to the government.
15 / Pension Choice in Japan 267
Empirical Analysis
We hypothesize that plan sponsors in Japan have sought to reduce risk by
terminating their DB plans or returning the contracted-out portion to the
government, instead of by reducing investment in riskier assets. In our
empirical analysis we build on related studies from other countries, which
relate plan sponsor financial characteristics to the decision to change pen-
sionplan type. In theUSA, for instance, Friedman(1983),Bodieet al. (1985)
and Petersen (1996) relate asset allocation decisions in DB plans to the risk
tolerance of the pension plan sponsors. They find that the plan sponsor’s
profitability tend to increase risk tolerance; this may be represented by
return on total assets (Petersen 1996) or return on net assets. Another
important factor is the plan sponsor’s financial stability, for which proxies
include the standard deviation of profits (Friedman 1983; Petersen 1996) or
the firm’s bond rating (Bodie et al. 1985). In general, they find that financial
instability narrows risk tolerance as well as flexibility to invest in riskier assets.
In the case of pensions, another important factor affecting risk tolerance
is the plan’s funding status, represented by the ratio of pension assets to
liabilities. A higher funding ratio leads to a higher risk tolerance and
allocation to riskier assets. Other controls include the maturity of the plan,
usually represented by the ratio of beneficiaries to active participants (or
active to total participants; Friedman 1983), and benefit payments divided
by assets and the year the plan started (Petersen 1996). A more mature
pension plan would be said to have less flexibility to invest in riskier assets.
Hypotheses. Drawing on these prior studies, we therefore hypothesize that
plan sponsors with lower risk tolerance would be more likely to terminate
their DB plans and return the contracted-out portion to the government.
Specifically:
. Hypothesis 1. Regarding Termination: Financial characteristics of plan
sponsors and pension plans that reduce risk tolerance expedite the
termination of EPFs;
. Hypothesis 2. Regarding Put-Back. Financial characteristics of plan
sponsors and pension plans that reduce risk tolerance expedite the
put-back of the contracted-out portion of EPFs.
To evaluate these we use Probit multivariate regression models to
explore the empirical relationships, controlling on several explanatory
variables.8
Determinants of Termination. To Hypothesis 1, the dependent variable
takes a value of 1 for EPFs terminated from April 2001 through June 2003,
and 0 for those which did not terminate in this period. This variable yt is
estimated by the following probability function used in the Probit
regression model:
268 Masaharu Usuki
yt
 ¼ at þ btxr þ htxh þ «t , where yt ¼ 1, if yt
 > 0
yt ¼ 0, if yt # 0:

The vector xr consists of factors that may cause plan termination due to
risk tolerance, while xh is a vector consisting of control factors that may
affect the decision to terminate. More specifically, we select four variables
to include in vector xr: the 5-year average return on shareholders’ equity
(ROE), the volatility of ROE (VROE), the funding ratio (FNDGRAT), in
the DB pension plan (pension assets divided by pension liabilities) and
the ratio of pension liabilities or pension assets to the plan sponsor’s total
assets on the balance sheet (PAVSAST or PLVSAST). We hypothesize that
risk tolerance would be reduced by lower profitability, higher volatility in
profits, a lower funding ratio, and a larger ratio of pension plan assets or
liabilities to business size of plan sponsor. Therefore, we expect the
regression model to generate coefficients that are negative for ROE,
positive for VROE, negative for FNDGRAT, and positive for PLVSAST
and PAVSAST.
As control variables in vector xh, we include three elements: an industry
dummy (INDUSTRY) indicating the plan sponsors’ main line of business
(where 0 means manufacturing and 1 means nonmanufacturing); the
ratio of taxes paid in the last five years to shareholder equity (TOE);
and a variable representing size which is the natural logarithm of plan
assets (LNPA) or natural logarithm of the number of employees
(LNEMP). The expected sign of the regression coefficient for INDUSTRY
is positive, since it is said that manufacturing companies pay more atten-
tion to the maintenance of long-term employment which employers try to
nurture by DB pension plans. Manufacturing companies are said to be
more willing to take on the financial risks associated with DB pensions for
the purpose of maintaining their employment practices. We expect a
negative regression coefficient for TOE, since the termination of EPFs
deprives plan sponsors having large taxable income of valuable tax defer-
rals. With regard to size (LNPA or LNEMP), we expect a negative regres-
sion coefficient, since there is a rule that requires a minimum number of
plan participants.9 (More precise variable definitions appear in Appendix
Table 15-A1).
Determinants of Put-back. To test Hypothesis 2, we assign the value of 1 to
EPFs that returned the contracted-out portion back to the government
between April 2001 and June 2003, and 0 to the rest. The probability
function used to estimate this variable yp is as follows:
yp
 ¼ ap þ bpxr þ hpxh þ «p , where yp ¼ 1, if yp
 > 0
yp ¼ 0, if yp # 0:

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In this estimate, we exclude EPFs that terminated because it is impossible
to return the contracted-out portion to the government once the EPF is
terminated.
Vectors xr and xh consist of the same variables as above; we expect
regression coefficients for each variable to have the same sign as indicated
above, except for the size variables (LNPA or LNEMP). For those, we
expect a positive regression coefficient, since we believe that from the
perspective of cost-efficiency, there are scale economies in DB plan oper-
ation. Putting back the contracted-out portion may decrease the size of
EPFs below critical volume and heighten the chances of scale diseco-
nomies. This means that the larger the size of the EPF, the easier it is to
return the contracted-out portion.
Data Sources. All accounting data and industry codes are taken from the
Nikkei Needs electronic database (2004). Data on EPF decisions as to
termination and put-back of the contracted-out portion were obtained
from the Ministry of Health Labor and Welfare (2003).10 Because of data
constraints, samples are limited to EPFs in existence as of March 2001,
when the new accounting standard was introduced. Further, we exclude
multi-employer EPFs unless they were managed by companies that are
consolidated for the purpose of financial reporting.
Results. Multivariate Probit regression estimates for termination models
appear in Table 15-2 where we use PAVSAST and PLVSAST as alternative
relative size controls, and LNPA and LNEMP as alternative absolute size
controls.
Among variables reflective of risk tolerance, the funding ratio of pension
plans (FNDGRAT) always generated coefficients with the expected signs
and were significant at conventional levels in half the regressions. Among
other variables, the coefficients for the ratio of pension plan assets or
liabilities to sponsor’s total assets (PAVSAST or PLVSAST), though signifi-
cant only at 10 percent level, were consistently positive as expected. The
coefficient for ROE was positive, contrary to expectations. Of the control
variables, coefficients for TOE, the industry dummies (INDUSTRY), and
logarithm of plan assets (LNPA) were insignificant. Notable are the coeffi-
cients for the logarithm of the number of employees (LNEMP), which were
negative at statistically significant levels. This means that smaller EPFs are
more likely to terminate, probably because of the legal requirement regard-
ing minimum number of participants.
These results suggest that plan sponsors with less risk tolerance, which we
attribute to larger volatility in return on equity, a lower funding ratio, and
larger pension plans relative to plan sponsor total assets, were more likely
to terminate their EPFs. In addition, the number of employees or partici-
pants seems to affect decisions to terminate EPFs.
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To explore the second hypothesis, we evaluate similar models with a
different dependent variable; results appear in Table 15-3. Coefficients on
risk tolerance for PAVSAST and PLVSAST (the relative size of pension plan
to sponsor total assets) were positive and highly significant. Coefficient
estimates for ROE, VROE, and FNDGRAT were all insignificant. Among
control variables, the LNEMP had a positive and statistically significant
effect; this means that small plan sponsors found it difficult to return the
contracted-out portion due to scale diseconomies after the put-back. We
also found that coefficients for industry (INDUSTRY) were always positive,
implying that plan sponsors in nonmanufacturing industries were more
likely to return the contracted-out portion. This is possibly because of less
risk in labor management as explained in more detail below. TOE was not
significant.
From these findings, we conclude that plan sponsors with less risk
tolerance, which we attribute to larger pension plans relative to plan
sponsor total assets, were more likely to return the contracted-out portion.
In addition, plan sponsors with larger EPFs and in nonmanufacturing
sector were more active in returning the contracted-out portion.
Table 15-2 Probit Results For Plan Termination
1 2 3 4
ROE 0.548 0.548 0.483 0.488
(0.427) (0.427) (0.373) (0.377)
VROE 1.586* 1.579* 1.446* 1.440*
(1.942) (1.932) (1.726) (1.719)
FNDGRAT 1.543y 1.126 1.634y 1.245*
(1.976) (1.509) (2.138) (1.722)
PAVSAST 1.849* 1.732
(1.656) (1.559)
PLVSAST 1.161* 1.084*
(1.787) (1.673)
TOE 0.200 0.264 0.643 0.690
(0.057) (0.075) (0.183) (0.197)
INDUSTRY 0.066 0.058 0.031 0.022
(0.302) (0.265) (0.141) (0.101)
LNPA 0.092 0.093
(1.215) (1.227)
LNEMP 0.193y 0.192*
(1.959) (1.948)
Source : Author’s calculations from 416 observations.
*significant at 10% level; ysignificant at 5% level
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Risks in Labor Management
In addition to financial risks explored here, we also note two risks in the
area of labor management that could influence employers’ views of chan-
ging plan type and benefit design. One is the risk of demoralizing employ-
ees. Pension plan termination and/or the introduction of DC or cash
balance plans appears to shift investment and longevity risks to employees.
The put-back of the contracted-out portion often means a reduction in the
amount of life annuity.11 As a result, employees lose old age income that
might be seen as more secure in a traditional DB plan. This is particularly
important in an environment such as Japan, where the public old age
pension is diminishing its role; that is, employees would be more likely to
appreciate receiving a stable benefit from their company pensions. Indeed,
unstable benefits might degrade employee morale, which in turn could
lower productivity or increase employee turnover.12 Employee demoraliza-
tion could be a major deterrent to choosing a benefit design which lowered
plan sponsor financial risks.
Table 15-3 Probit Results for Put-Back
5 6 7 8
ROE 0.334 0.352 0.333 0.353
(0.252) (0.266) (0.253) (0.268)
VROE 0.497 0.663 0.490 0.501
(0.542) (0.710) (0.537) (0.549)
FNDGRAT 0.005 0.602 0.044 0.693
(0.009) (1.067) (0.080) (1.299)
PAVSAST 3.201* 3.351*
(3.490) (3.672)
PLVSAST 1.823* 1.923*
(3.287) (3.484)
TOE 2.659 2.625 3.329 3.301
(0.930) (0.917) (1.154) (1.142)
INDUSTRY 0.273 0.250 0.278y 0.255
(1.624) (1.498) (1.652) (1.526)
LNPA 0.079 0.081
(1.544) (1.574)
LNEMP 0.185* 0.186*
(2.660) (2.679)
Source : Author’s calculations from 379 observations.
*significant at 1%; **significant at 5%; ysignificant at 10%.
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The other risk to note is the problems that arise if employee tenure
cannot be well-controlled, and DB plan formulas have long been associated
with control over employee tenure. Figure 15-3 depicts the present value of
benefits on the vertical axis and employee age on the horizontal axis; it
shows that this hypothetical plan sponsor wants employees to stay on the
job at least fifteen to twenty years, but employee severance is preferred after
thirty years of service or after age 50. In this way, the DB formula is an
important tool to maintain long-term employment practices and to termin-
ate them at some prearranged point. This use of a DB plan to effect labor
management has been popular in automobile and other manufacturing
industries where plan sponsors have sought to accumulate enterprise-spe-
cific employee expertise. If employers in these industries were to change
DB into cash balance or DC plans, they might risk losing their ability to
influence tenure.
Nevertheless, an increasing portion of plan sponsors in Japan is no
longer focused on the maintenance of long-term employment practices.
Instead, many firms have adopted merit-based compensation systems, even
including retirement benefits. For example, several large companies have
introduced cash balance plans because benefits there are based on average
salary, and the benefit amount can easily reflect employees’ performance
over their careers.
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Figure 15-3. Amount of retirement benefits by tenure.
Source : Author’s calculations using the data from Staff of Central Labor Relations
Commission (2002).
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Conclusions
This chapter suggests that that pension plan sponsors in Japan have
sought to manage pension financial risks when choosing and changing
pension plan types. This is a new development in Japan, especially regard-
ing the termination of DB plans, though it confirms studies from other
countries. Important determinants of DB plan termination include the
VROE, the pension plan FNDGRAT, and the size of pension assets and
liabilities relative to the size of the plan sponsor. In addition, we found that
plan size also influenced decisions to terminate many Japanese EPFs.
Regarding the decision to put-back the contracted-out portion of the
EPF, we identified several significant factors. These include the size of
pension assets and liabilities relative to plan sponsors businesses, and the
total number of employees. In other words, plan-type choice is an import-
ant part of corporate risk management when the portfolio includes
pension liabilities.
Data constraints preclude a direct analysis of firms’ decisions to intro-
duce DC or cash balance plans. Nevertheless, a research institute affiliated
with the Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare showed that plan sponsors
most focused on pension financial risks (especially the volatility of liabilities
caused by changes in the discount rate) had the strongest interest in
adopting a cash balance plan (Research Institute for Policies on Aging
2003). Future research could extend our analysis to an examination of
the introduction of DC plans and cash balance plans as well.
Table 15-A1 Variable Definitions
Explanatory variables
ROE 5-year average of net profits fiscal 1996–2000 divided by
average of shareholders’ equity in the same 5-year period.
VROE Standard deviation of net profits from fiscal 1996–2000
divided by average of shareholders’ equity in the same
5-year period.
FNDGRAT Value of pension asset divided by projected benefit
obligations disclosed in financial statements at March 2001.
PLVSAST Value of projected benefit obligations divided by total assets
of plan sponsors disclosed in financial statements at
March 2001
PAVSAST Value of pension assets divided by total assets of plan
sponsors disclosed in financial statements at March 2001.
INDUSTRY Nonmanufacturing ¼ 1, manufacturing ¼ 0.
TOE 5-year average of taxes paid from fiscal 1996–2000 divided by
average of shareholders equity in the same 5-year period.
LNPA Natural logarithm of pension assets.
LNEMP Natural logarithm of number of employees.
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Dependent variables
PUT back EPFs putting back contracted-out portion since April 2001
through June 2003 ¼ 1, no put-back ¼ 0.
TERMINATE EPFs terminated since April 2001 through June
2003 ¼ 1, no termination ¼ 0.
Table 15-A2 Descriptive Statistics
Min. Max. Mean Std. dev.
Test 1 ROE 0.7271 0.5428 0.0057 0.0972
VROE 0.0038 1.3282 0.0884 0.1306
FNDGRAT 0.0608 0.9854 0.5954 0.1289
PLVSAST 0.0071 0.7281 0.2392 0.1396
PAVSAST 0.0014 0.4486 0.1412 0.0880
TOE 0.0018 0.1988 0.0492 0.0311
LNPA 4.3041 14.4228 10.0682 1.3476
LNEMP 5.2204 11.4189 7.6916 1.0153
Test 2 ROE 0.7271 0.1923 0.0075 0.0898
VROE 0.0038 1.3282 0.0819 0.1179
FNDGRAT 0.2000 0.9854 0.6001 0.1270
PLVSAST 0.0071 0.7281 0.2353 0.1387
PAVSAST 0.0000 0.4500 0.1401 0.0885
TOE 0.0018 0.1930 0.0489 0.0290
LNPA 4.3000 14.4200 10.0996 1.3645
LNEMP 5.2204 11.4189 7.7286 1.0179
Our findings imply that financial risks will remain a main concern for
pension plan sponsors in Japan. The future will likely witness an increase in
plan terminations and put-backs of the contracted-out portion of EPFs, as
well as additional conversions from traditional DB to cash balance and DC
plans. Our analysis of Japan’s experience in pension planmanagement also
holds some implications for other developed countries. Since 2000, finan-
cial market conditions in Europe and North America have begun to resem-
ble conditions experienced in Japan over the past decade. Stagnant rates of
return due to the sluggish stock market, ballooning pension obligations,
and changes in accounting standards, are forcing plan sponsors to pay far
more attention to benefit design than ever before. Many of these factors are
particularly familiar in the UK, where DB final salary based pension
schemes have increasingly closed out new entrants and suspended benefit
accruals (Veysey 2003). And in the USA, more than half of all corporate
executives with DB plans are seriously considering changes in retirement
programs (Feinberg 2004). Our analysis of the relationship between pen-
sion plan design and financial risk management is therefore relevant to
and may be troubling for many DB stakeholders.
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Endnotes
The author is grateful for comments and guidance by Robert Clark, Olivia Mitchell,
and Stephen Utkus.
1. The probability is 0.88 percent in a log-normal distribution and 0.63 percent in
a normal distribution.
2. These numbers are averages for 1,006 companies whose accounting data on
pension assets/liabilities are available for three continuous accounting periods
ending March 2003.
3. Those who advocate that pension fund management needs a paradigm shift
(see Chapter 11) might suggest that plan sponsors could have improved fund-
ing by changing their asset allocation mix.
4. The original form of most of Japanese retirement benefits is a lump sum
payment. After the establishment of DB plans, this lump sum value has increas-
ingly been converted to an annuity using a specified interest rate.
5. This reduction is possible provided that two-thirds of pensioners agree, and that
pension plans reimburse the present value of benefits in lump sum if any of
pensioners so request.
6. In the case of a put-back, an asset amount equal to the liability for the con-
tracted-out portion must be returned to the government, specifically to the
Government Pension Investment Corporation, instead of to the Employee
Pension Fund Association.
7. The maximum amount is 216,000 yen per annum if an employer has a DB plan,
and 432,000 yen per annum if there is no other pension plan at the same
employer. These ceilings will be raised by 60,000 yen and 120,000 yen respect-
ively from 2005.
8. Unfortunately, data for DC plans, cash balance plans, and benefit reduction,
and data for TQPPs are not publicly available, nor are variables to represent DB
plan maturity in Japan.
9. The minimum number of participants is 500 for single-employer EPFs and 800
for multi-employer EPFs.
10. Descriptive statistics for variables appear in Appendix Table A2.
11. There is a rule that requires EPFs to pay at least 50 percent of their retirement
benefits in life annuity combined with the contracted-out portion. This rule
does not apply to EPFs after they return the contracted-out portion.
12. Although agreement with labor is required to alter the benefit design, it is
difficult for the employees’ side to refuse an employer’s proposal, given loose
labor market conditions in Japan at present.
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